Sectona at Infosecurity Europe 2025 | June 3–5 | ExCeL London
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Securing Non-Human Identities: A Privileged Access Security Imperative
The Growth of Machine Identities
Non-human identities (NHIs) underpin enterprise systems, with multiple forms of digital identities existing across networks. These identities are assigned to systems rather than individuals and enable applications, services, and automated processes to authenticate and interact with other systems.
NHIs act on behalf of software components, allowing workloads to access resources, execute tasks, and communicate within and across environments. They operate across cloud platforms, SaaS applications, on-premises systems, and DevOps pipelines, often with privileged access.
The number of non-human identities increases with cloud adoption, microservices architectures, and automated delivery pipelines. According to the Cloud Security Alliance, machine identities outnumber human identities in cloud environments, driven by automation and distributed computing models.
This increase is associated with:
- Adoption of cloud-native development practices
- Expansion of microservices and API ecosystems
- Use of infrastructure as code
- Continuous integration and deployment workflows
- Integration between SaaS and internal systems
Non-human identities differ from human users in behaviour and lifecycle. They operate continuously, authenticate through embedded credentials, and execute predefined tasks. These characteristics require control over how privileged access is granted, used, and monitored.
The Risk Landscape – When Non-Human Identities Become Vulnerabilities
The risks associated with non-human identities arise from their design and deployment practices.
Credential Exposure
Machine credentials are stored in configuration files, scripts, and code repositories. Static secrets increase the risk of leakage and unauthorised reuse.
Privilege Persistence
Service accounts and tokens retain long-lived access. Privileges are not reviewed based on current requirements.
Over-Provisioning
Permissions granted to machine identities exceed operational needs. This increases exposure.
Lack of Visibility
Machine-to-machine interactions generate large volumes of activity. Without monitoring, distinguishing normal behaviour from malicious activity is difficult.
Limited Attribution
Actions executed by non-human identities are not always tied to specific owners or processes. This limits investigation and accountability.
These conditions establish the requirement for control over privileged access.
Real Case Scenarios
1. Exposure of Deployment Credentials
A financial services organisation experienced a breach through its deployment pipeline. Configuration files within a repository contained embedded API credentials linked to a service account.
The service account had permissions to deploy workloads across multiple environments. An attacker accessed the repository, extracted the credentials, and initiated unauthorised deployments.
Key Observations:
- Credentials were static and stored in plain text.
- The service account retained persistent deployment privileges.
- No monitoring existed for deployment sessions.
The attacker operated within valid access boundaries.
Control Gap:
Credential storage and access were not governed.
2. Token Misuse in Microservices Architecture
A technology provider operating a microservices environment relied on tokens for service authentication. Each service used tokens to access internal APIs.
An attacker exploited a vulnerability in one service and retrieved its token. The token allowed access to additional services within the environment. The attacker used this access to query data and move across services.
Key Observations:
- Tokens were not restricted to defined scopes.
- No time-bound access controls were enforced.
- Monitoring did not detect service interactions outside defined patterns.
The absence of access control enabled lateral movement.
Control Gap:
Token scope and lifecycle were not enforced.
3. Shared Service Account in Hybrid Systems
An enterprise operating hybrid infrastructure maintained a service account for integration between legacy systems and cloud platforms. The account had administrative privileges and was shared across multiple applications.
The credentials were exposed during a phishing attack targeting a development team member. The attacker used the credentials to access systems across environments.
Key Observations:
- The account had privileges beyond operational requirements.
- Credentials were shared across systems.
- No session-level tracking was implemented.
The attacker accessed both on-premises and cloud systems using the same identity.
Control Gap:
Access isolation and activity tracking were not implemented.
The Security Importance of Non-Human Identities
Non-human identities require control due to their scale, privilege levels, and operational roles. These identities must be governed through the same level of control applied to privileged access, with a focus on how access is granted, used, and monitored.
Control must be established across four areas:
Credential Exposure Points
Machine credentials must not reside in code repositories, configuration files, or pipeline definitions. Centralised vaulting must be enforced.
Privilege Boundaries
Access assigned to non-human identities must follow least privilege. Permissions should be scoped to defined tasks and reviewed.
Runtime Access Control
Access must not remain persistent. Just-in-time mechanisms should grant privileges for defined durations.
Execution Visibility
All activity performed by non-human identities must be monitored at the session level to enable traceability.
Without these controls, credential misuse, privilege escalation, and lateral movement can occur without detection.
Defining a Control Strategy for Securing Non-Human Identities
At the implementation stage, organisations must establish controls that address identified risks.
Credential Management
Credentials should be stored in secure vaults. Static secrets should be replaced with dynamic credentials.
Privilege Enforcement
Access should follow least privilege principles and be aligned with operational requirements.
Just-in-Time Access
Privileges should be granted for defined durations and revoked after use.
Session Monitoring
All privileged activity must be monitored and recorded.
Lifecycle Governance
Machine identities must be tracked from creation to decommissioning, including credential rotation and removal of unused identities.
Behavioural Analysis
Machine activity patterns should be analysed to identify deviations from defined baselines.
These controls establish governance over access used by non-human identities.
Summary
Non-human identities define how systems operate and interact. Their use within enterprise environments requires control over privileged access aligned with operational requirements.
Security teams must establish governance over how access is assigned, used, and monitored. This requires enforcement of policy, control over credentials, and visibility into activity.
The Sectona Security Platform provides capabilities for protecting NHIs. The platform integrates with existing identity infrastructure while providing the extensibility to support emerging patterns including backing for workload identity federation and confidential computing attestation.
Control must be enforced at the point of access. Each privileged interaction performed by a non-human identity must be governed, monitored, and aligned with defined security policies.
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